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SURVEY SECTION
Regulation of the Legal Profession. In re Ferrey, 774 A.2d 62
(R.I. 2001). The Rhode Island Supreme Court possesses ultimate
and exclusive authority to determine who may or may not be per-
mitted to practice law in Rhode Island and nonresident attorneys
must file pro hac vice motions with the court prior to practicing in
Rhode Island.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Steven E. Ferrey (Ferrey) was a member in good standing of
the Massachusetts bar.' He sought permission to continue provid-
ing legal services for his client in front of the Energy Facility Siting
Board, a state administrative agency.2 He filed a pro hac vice mo-
tion in the Rhode Island Supreme Court.3 His motion was filed in
the alternative; he requested permission to practice in front of the
board beginning from the time of the filing of the motion "and/or"
that the admission be made nunc pro tunc, as he had already been
practicing law in front of the agency board.4 The agency gave Fer-
rey the specific permission to practice in front of it. 5
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted that part of the mo-
tion seeking prospective permission to practice, but would not ret-
roactively grant the motion to the time when it should have been
filed, before Ferrey's first appearance in front of the agency. 6 The
court said that it had "never before, in any published opinion or
order, granted a pro hac vice request nunc pro tunc when to do so
'would be tantamount to affixing an ex post facto imprimatur of
approval on what might under some circumstances be construed as
the unauthorized practice of law."' 7 Rhode Island General Laws
section 11-27-5 prohibits the practice of law by non-members of the
1. In re Ferrey, 774 A.2d 62, 63 (R.I. 2001); see also Peter S. Margulies, Pro-
tecting the Public without Protectionism: Access, Competence and Pro Hac Vice Ad-
mission to the Practice of Law, 7 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 285 (2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 65.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 63.
7. Id. (quoting In re Church, 303 A.2d 758, 759 (R.I. 1973)).
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Rhode Island bar.8 Rhode Island General Laws section 11-27-2 de-
fines the practice of law as "the doing of any act for another person
usually done by attorneys at law in the course of their profes-
sion ... includ[ing]: ... acting as the attorney... before any court,
referee, master, auditor, division, department, commission, board,
judicial person, or body authorized . . . to exercise any judicial
power . . .9
Thus, Article II, Rule 9, of the Rhode Island Supreme Court
Rules was promulgated to address the admission of out-of-state at-
torneys desiring to practice law in Rhode Island. 10 However, noth-
ing in the rule mentions granting pro hac vice permission to
represent clients in any place other than a court, including in front
of boards and agencies." The omission of such language did not
deprive the court "of [their] unquestioned inherent right" to permit
such practice. 12 Modern conditions are such that a great deal of
the practice of law is performed "'outside of any court and having
no immediate relation to proceedings in court.'"'13 Therefore, be-
cause the exclusive and ultimate authority to determine who may
practice law in Rhode Island is vested with the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court, the court may allow the practice of law before any
agency, board or commission. 14
8. Id. Section 11-27-5 reads: "No person, except a member of the bar of this
state, whose authority as a member to practice law is in full force and effect, shall
practice law in this state." R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-27-5 (2000).
9. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-27-2 (2000) (emphasis added by court)).
10. Id. at 64. Article II, Rule 9 states, in pertinent part:
Any attorney who is a member in good standing of the bar of any other
state, not residing in this state, may, upon special and infrequent occasion
and for good cause shown upon written motion presented by a member of
the bar of this state, be permitted in the discretion of the court to partici-
pate to such an extent as the court may prescribe in the presentation of a
cause or appeal in any court of this state ....
R.I. S. Ct. Art. II, R. 9. The rule continues and lists the prerequisites for showing
good cause, such as: specialization in a complex field of law; a longstanding attor-
ney-client relationship; a lack of local counsel with adequate expertise in the area
of law; a question of law of a foreign jurisdiction; a need for extensive discovery in a
foreign jurisdiction. Id.
11. See Ferrey, 774 A.2d at 64.
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting R.I. Bar Ass'n v. Auto. Serv. Ass'n, 179 A. 139, 144 (R.I.
1935)).
14. Id. (citing Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. State, 543 A.2d 662,
664 (R.I. 1988)).
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Absent prior permission, an out-of state lawyer who is practic-
ing in Rhode Island is committing a criminal offense.15 Further, it
is illegal to receive any form of remuneration for the practice of law
without prior permission from the Rhode Island Supreme Court.16
State law provides for penalties and the duty is on the Attorney
General to enforce the law. 17 Whether Ferrey had been engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law by appearing in front of the state
agency was an issue not before the court.' s
In its strongest tone, the court noted:
This Supreme Court alone possesses sole authority to deter-
mine who may, and who may not, engage in the practice of
law in this state. No municipal or state board, agency or com-
mission shares in that authority, and none has ever been del-
egated by this Court to any municipal or state board, agency
or commission. 19
Thus, the law was clear that it is unlawful to practice law any-
where in Rhode Island without pro hac vice permission. 20 Ferrey
was a nonresident who had been given permission by the agency to
practice, although the agency had no authority to do S0.21 The
court noted that he, like everyone else in the state, is presumed to
know what the law is, but that his ignorance was "somewhat un-
derstandable."22 Therefore, because of the ignorance and the mis-
takenly given permission, Ferrey's request for continued
representation was granted. 23 However, though Ferrey may not
have known the law, the court was not willing to assist in what
section 11-27-5 prohibits by granting the motion nunc pro tunc be-
cause they "are duty bound to follow that law and not blindly ig-
nore or condone past transgressions thereof."24
15. Id. at 63, 64 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-27-5 (2000)).
16. Id. at 64 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-27-6 (2000)).
17. Id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-27-14, 11-27-19 (2000)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 65.
20. Id. at 64.
21. Id. at 65.
22. Id. However, the court cited Massachusetts case law, the state where Fer-
rey was authorized to practice, for very similar reasoning regarding judicial au-
thority and statutory penalties in this context. Id. at 65 n.2 (citing Lowell Bar
Ass'n v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Mass. 1943)).
23. Id. at 65.
24. Id.
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Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Flanders agreed with the majority that the motion
should be granted, however, he disagreed with the majority be-
cause the motion was not granted nunc pro tunc.25 Article II, Rule
9, is limited and there are no other explicit rules regarding pro hac
vice motions for the issue at bar.26 Additionally, granting the mo-
tion nunc pro tunc would also prevent the "inevitable tactical at-
tempts-apparently already begun" that would undo what Ferrey
had already done in the administrative proceedings, particularly
since there was no apparent bad faith or wilful misconduct.27
Justice Flanders also addressed the pro hac vice process. Ad-
mission for nonresident lawyers should be governed through a
rulemaking procedure, rather than the current practice of filing
miscellaneous petitions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 28 In
that way, a procedure for nonresident lawyers who want to provide
transactional legal services in Rhode Island could be established
after providing notice, hearings and a public comment period. 29
When the court selectively grants or denies the a pro hac vice re-
quest they "are roiling the waters of the bar unnecessarily, only to
reap a tidal wave of confusion and fear in response."3 0 There are
no rules, no standards and no clear tests. This could potentially
create problems for attorneys who act in good faith and could cre-
ate unnecessary collateral litigation regarding the validity of work
performed by a nonresident attorney in Rhode Island. 31 It would
be more appropriate for the court, the bar and other interested par-
ties to come together and promulgate a rule addressing multijris-
dictional practice and the myriad of other situations that would
require pro hac vice approval.32
Justice Flanders also opined that the statutory provisions at
issue do not address visiting attorneys, licensed in another state
and in Rhode Island on temporary business.33 "[Elven though the
regular, continuous, or permanent practice of law in this state by
25. Id. at 65-66 (Flanders, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).






32. Id. at 66-67.
33. Id. at 67.
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nonresident attorneys would be unlawful without obtaining admis-
sion to the Rhode Island bar, legal business that is performed
'while temporarily in this state' by nonresident attorneys is argua-
bly permissible."34 Because there was no evidence in the record to
suggest that Ferrey regularly practiced law in Rhode Island, grant-
ing the motion nunc pro tunc would not, despite the majority's as-
sertions, be sanctioning illegal activity.
35
Section 11-27-3, concerning receipt of fees, was inapplicable to
Ferrey, as well. 36 That is because the statute is not triggered until
a third party assignee of a fee owed to an attorney receives part of
that attorney's fee.3 7 That situation was not present in the case at
bar and, thus, the statute was inapplicable.
38
CONCLUSION
In In re Ferrey, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reaffirmed
that they alone possess the authority to allow or disallow the prac-
tice of law in Rhode Island. The power extends to all practice, in-
cluding appearing in front of boards, agencies and commission.
Granting a pro hac vice request nunc pro tunc could be considered
as authorizing an illegal activity. The pro hac vice power remains
exclusively within the power of the Rhode Island Supreme Court
and it has never been delegated.
Stephen P. Cooney
34. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-27-13 (2000)).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing Pearlman v. Rowell, 401 A.2d 19, 20 (R.I. 1979)).
38. Id.
